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EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY
INSURANCE (EPLI) POLICIES: WHO
CONTROLS SELECTION OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL
JOSEPH

P.

MONTELEONE*

INTRODUCTION

Labor-employment law has traditionally been a fairly special
ized area of practice provided by certain "boutique" firms (some
confining their practice solely on behalf of management as opposed
to labor or vice versa) and specialized practice groups within larger
firms. It is not unusual for a large employer to tum to a single one
of these firms for all of its employment-related legal work and de
velop a long-term and extensive relationship with them. Particu
larly when a firm has numerous offices nationwide, the relationship
may be one without any practical geographic limitations.
With the growing popularity of employment practices liability
insurance ("EPLI") over the recent years, the question arises under
those policies as to who controls the defense process, including the
choice of counsel. Although there is no "generic" EPLI policy
form, the major underwriters of this business all appear to be uni
form, in that their policies' language clearly provides the insurer
with the right and duty to defend and the right to select and appoint
defense counsel on behalf of the insureds under the policy.

* Joseph P. Monteleone is Senior Vice President and Claims Counsel for Reli
ance National. The opinions expressed herein are personal to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of Reliance National or of any insurance company in the
Reliance National Insurance Group. Further, the author, through these materials, does
not purport to restate, explain, or interpret any policy of insurance issued by a member
company in the Reliance Insurance Group.
While the information contained in these materials is believed to be accurate and
authoritative, it is not intended to be a substitute for specific legal, insurance, or other
professional advice. The reader should consult legal and/or insurance professionals for
advice or assistance on specific issues of interest.
The author gratefully acknowledges the considerable and able assistance of
Nicholas J. Conca, Vice President and Claims Counsel at Reliance National, and Linda
M. Soughan, Claims Counsel at Reliance National, in researching and preparing, in
particular, the discussions of New York and Illinois law.
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That having been said, the insurer's rights in this regard are
often tempered by a number of legal, as well as business and practi
cal considerations. Given that the EPLI product is relatively new,
there is presently no caselaw guidance specific to these policies.
However, the issue has been frequently considered under other lia
bility insurance policies, and the guidance provided by those deci
sions should in many respects be applicable to EPLI.
As EPLI policies are of the "duty to defend" variety, it is help
ful to examine decisions construing the extent of the insurer's right
to select defense counsel under commercial or comprehensive gen
eral liability and other types of policies that impose a duty to de
fend. Absent any significant coverage issues that might give rise to
a conflict of interest between the insurer and its insureds, the in
surer may generally rely on its policy contract language providing it
with the right to select the insured's defense counsel.1 When the
insurer assumes the defense of its insured subject to a reservation of
rights, however, one of the first significant issues presented for reso
lution is whether the insurer will be able to control the selection of
defense counsel.
Although counsel who defends the insured, regardless of
whether such counsel is selected by the insurer or the insured itself,
will always owe its primary (if not sole) fiduciary duty to the in
sured as its client, counsel selected by the insurer also has an attor
ney-client relationship with the insurer as well.2 It is this
"secondary allegiance" that has caused some courts and commenta
tors to hold that the insurer should be precluded from controlling
the selection of counsel in most reservation of rights situations. 3 As
will be discussed below, however, not every reservation of rights or
assertion of a partial disclaimer of coverage should give rise to a
relinquishment of what would otherwise be the right of the insurer
to select defense counsel. 4
This Article explores the law of three important jurisdictions
with respect to this issue, namely, California, New York, and Illi
1. See, e.g., Cardin v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 330 (D. Md. 1990);
McGee v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peppers, 64 III. 2d 187,355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
2. See Doctors' Ins. Servs. Co. v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1342 (Cal. March 28, 1991); Illinois Mun.
League Risk Management Ass'n v. Seibert, 223 III. App. 3d 864, 585 N.E.2d 1130, ap
peal denied, 145 III.2d 634, 596 N.E.2d 628 (1992).
3. See generally Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1990);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 503 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1974).
4. See Federal Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
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nois. This type of analysis provides an illustration of how the courts
have addressed the process of selecting counsel. As noted above,
courts have not yet addressed this issue in the context of EPLI cov
erage, but a look back at how the issue historically has been treated
by the courts nevertheless is instructive. This Article also discusses
some of the practical dynamics of the EPLI relationship and pro
vides some insight into how this issue might be addressed in the·
EPLI arena.
I.

CALIFORNIA

Probably the most notorious judicial decision in this area was
the commonly-referenced Cumis case in California in the mid
1980s.5 In summary, the Cumis court held that once the insurer
reserved rights, it relinquished the right to unconditionally select
counsel and had to reimburse the insured for the costs of counsel it
retained to defend itself and protect its potentially uninsured
interest.
Cumis, however, has been clarified by both statute, at section
2860 of the California Civil Code and subsequent judicial deci
sions. 6 For example, it is now clear that not every reservation of
rights gives rise to the right to independent counsel but rather only
those reservations on coverage issues which, by their nature, can be
influenced by the way the defense is conducted. 7 Perhaps the prime
example of this would be a reservation to deny on the basis of in
tentional misconduct. Although it would be to the mutual advan
tage of insured and insurer to support a position of no liability, if
there were to be liability on the part of the insured to the claimant,
the insurer would be in a better position if the insured's culpable
conduct was intentional, as opposed to a lesser degree such as
negligence.
.
However, the mere fact that the insurer asserts the position
that there would be no coverage for punitive damages, if awarded,
does not give rise to the right to Cumis counsel.8 Likewise, the Cal
5. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
6. See, e.g., Centennial Ins. Co. v. Murat, 253 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(Not officially published); McGee v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
7. This rule is not particular to California insurance jurisprudence. See, e.g., Steel
Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
8. CAL. CIv. CoDE § 2860(b) (1993); see also Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 440
N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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ifornia Civil Code now provides that no conflict of interest exists
merely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of insur
ance policy limits.9
Further, the insurer has some protection from abusive billings
by Cumis counsel. Courts have held that such counsel are only en
titled to be reimbursed at prevailing rates in effect by the insurer
for its own panel counsel in the particular geographic area and area
of practice. 10
A California appellate decision, rendered after both the deci
sion in Cumis and enactment of the current version of section 2860
but commenting upon the obligations of an insured without regard
to that decision and statute, further clarifies the parties rights and
obligations in this area. l l
[T]he duty of good faith imposed upon an insured includes the
obligation to act reasonably in selecting as independent [defense]
counsel an experienced attorney qualified to present a meaning
ful defense and willing to engage in ethical billing practices sus
ceptible to review at a standard stricter than that of the
marketplace .12

II.

NEW YORK

Unlike California, the general rule in New York has not been
codified but is embodied in two landmark decisions both rendered
by the New York Court of Appeals. The first, Prashker v. United
States Guarantee Co. P dates back to the 1950s and the second,
Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goldfarb, 14 was issued ap
proximately twenty-five years later, in 1981. These decisions leave
little doubt that New York law in this area is very much like that of
California: if a conflict of interest exists between the insured and
the insurer with respect to the defense of a claim, the insured is
entitled to counsel of its own choosing.
This rule has been amplified, however, by subsequent decisions
of other courts, including the New York state intermediate appel
9.
St. Paul
at 964.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Courts outside California have ruled similarly. See, e.g., Zieman Mfg. Co. v.
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 724 F. 2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1983); Parker, 440 N.Y.S.2d
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a}.
Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 136 N.E.2d 871 (1956).
444 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
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late courts and federal courts interpreting New York law.1 5 As dis
cussed below, where courts have departed from or otherwise
expanded the seemingly absolute rule enunciated by the New York
Court of Appeals, they have done so because of distinguishable pol
icy.language or compelling factual settings.
As in California, the New York courts have not specifically ad
dressed this issue in the context of an employment practices policy.
However, there is no reason to suspect that the Prashker and Gold
farb analyses would be applied any differently to an employment
practices policy than they have been to other duty to defend
policies.
To provide some background, Prashker involved a coverage is
sue under a liability policy that insured, among other things, a pri
vate plane owned by a corporation. During one flight, the plane
was piloted by Nathan Prashker, accompanied by a single passen
ger. Prashker held a license to pilot an aircraft under visual flying
conditions, but he was not licensed to fly under instrument flying
conditions. The plane took off in dense fog and ultimately crashed,
killing both people.
The passenger's heirs filed suit against Prashker's estate, and
the estate sought defense and indemnity coverage under the liabil
ity policy. The insurer denied any obligation under the policy, on
the ground that the policy excluded coverage for any insured who
operated an aircraft in violation of Civil Aeronautics Administra
tion regulations. Prashker's operation of the plane in foggy condi
tions did indeed constitute such a violation. A declaratory
judgment action ensued.
The court concluded that some of the allegations against Prash
ker's estate were based on negligence and thus potentially would be
covered under the policy. Other allegations, however, were
grounded upon regulatory violations, which were excluded from
coverage. Notwithstanding the fact that the complaint pled poten
tially covered allegations, the insurer argued that it could not be
expected to defend the suit because,
[I]t would subject to divided loyalty any attorneys who might de
fend the action, in that their duty to the assureds would be to
endeavor to defeat recovery on any ground, whereas their duty
to the insurance company would be to defeat recovery only upon
such grounds as might render the insurance company liable,16
15. See infra notes 16 to 30.
16. Prashker, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 136 N.E.2d at 876.
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The court, however, easily resolved this problem by noting that,
If any such conflict of interests arises, as it probably will, the se

lection of the attorneys to represent the assureds should be made
by them rather than by the insurance company, which should re
main liable for the payment of the reasonable value of the serv
ices of whatever attorneys the assureds selectP
New York's Court of Appeals thus crafted the general rule that
continues to stand today, albeit with considerable massaging in sub
sequent decisions.
Approximately twenty-five years later, the New York Court of
Appeals reiterated this rule of law in the Goldfarb decision. IS In
that case, an insured dentist sought coverage under his professional
liability policy for his defense in a suit by a former patient charging
sexual abuse. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds, among
others, that the complaint alleged criminal acts, which were unin
surable under New York's public policy.
The court drew a distinction, however, between a criminal act
that caused an intended injury (which is uninsurable) and a criminal
or intentional act that caused an unintended injury (which is insura
ble),19 The issue of whether the insured committed uninsurable
acts was one that could only be determined after the factual record
of the case was fully developed. In the meantime, the insurer owed
the insured a defense in the action.
Given that the insurer's interest in defending the suit was in
conflict with the insured's - the insurer being liable only upon a
showing that the insured's acts caused unintended injuries - the
insured was entitled to a defense by an attorney of his own choos
ing. The reasonable fees of such attorney were to be paid by the
insurer.
In a footnote, the Goldfarb court provided some additional
guidance on the issue of when a conflict necessitating separate
counsel arises. The court stated:
That is not to say that a conflict of interest requiring retention of
separate counsel will arise in every case where multiple claims
are made. Independent counsel is only necessary in cases where
the defense attorney's duty to the insured would require that he
defeat liability on any ground and his duty to the insurer would
require that he defeat liability only upon grounds which would
17. Id.
18. Goldfarb, 444 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 N.E.2d 810.
19. Id. at 401, 425 N.E.2d at 815.
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render the insurer liable. When such a conflict is apparent, the
insured must be free to choose his own counsel whose reasonable
fee is to be paid by the insurer. On the other hand, where multi
ple claims present no conflict - for example, where the insur
ance contract provides liability coverage only for personal
injuries and the claim against the insured seeks recovery for
property damage as well as for personal injuries - no threat of
divided loyalty is present and there is no need for the retention of
separate counsel. This is so because in such a situation the ques
tion of insurance coverage is not intertwined with the question of
the insured's liability.2o

The court set "parameters" for determining whether a conflict
of interest exists requiring the retention of separate counsel in a
given case. The scope of these parameters, which was not precisely
defined by the Goldfarb court, has been the subject of much debate
since the Goldfarb decision.
One later decision held that so long as a potential conflict ex
isted between the insured and the insurer, independent counsel was
necessary.21 In that case, the face of the complaint only contained
allegations of negligence. The insurance company conceded, how
ever, that it intended to investigate the matter with an eye towards
avoiding coverage by showing that the insured acted intentionally.
Upon considering prior decisions in which the above footnote
in Goldfarb was at issue, the court held that the insurance company
was required to look beyond the complaint to determine whether,
as a factual matter, a conflict necessitated independent counsel.
The inquiry did not end merely because the complaint itself con
tained no allegations of intentional misconduct. . The insurance
company could salvage its right to appoint counsel only if no "ex
traneous" conflicts potentially could arise. Since the specter of a
denial of coverage loomed over the insured, independent counsel
was warranted.
Separate and apart from the issue of whether a conflict exists
because covered and non-covered claims are asserted against the
insured, there is the issue of litigation strategy. What if the allega
tions in the complaint are completely covered, but the insured and
the insurer simply have different interests in how to defend the
claim? Does that situation create a conflict that would require the
retention of separate counsel? One New York appellate court an
20. [d. at 401, 425 N.E.2d at 815.
21. Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Guagenti, 599 N.Y.S.2d 215,' 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993)
(citing Baron v. Home Ins. Co., 492 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1985)).
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swered that question in the affirmative and held that the insurer
could not defeat its insured's right to select independent counsel by
arguing that collectively they were united in interest in their pursuit
of defeating the claimant. The court observed:
In practically all, if not all cases, the insured and the insurer will
have a common interest in defeating the claim made against the
insured. What changed the rights of the insurer and the insured
in those cases were the conflicts arising from their divergent in
terests, in how they would prefer to go about defeating such
claims. The interests of [the insured] and [the insurer] diverged
seriously here, though each wished to defeat the claim. . .. [The
insurer], having insured the title of a heavily mortgaged property,
could proceed leisurely. [The insured] needed a quicker resolu
tion to keep open the possibility of refinancing, to retain custom
ers and employees, and to stay in business. There was a crucial
conflict of interests between them, and [the insured] had the right
to its own attomeys.22

As in California, the New York courts thus have moved be
yond an assessment of coverage issues in evaluating whether in
dependent counsel is needed. It is clear that if counsel's tactical
decisions in the litigation can adversely impact the interests of
either the insured or the insurer, counsel must be independent. 23
This issue of divergence in litigation strategy is present in many
EPLI cases. Take the example of a claim for sexual harassment
against a prominent business person who works for a well known
company with a "clean" reputation. The insured in that case may
look to resolve the matter· quickly and quietly, and may be willing
to settle the claim for a larger amount for public relations reasons.
The EPLI insurer, on the other hand, may want to litigate the mat
ter in order to discredit the plaintiff's case, thus driving down the
settlement value of the claim. Here, under the rationale of 69th
Street and Ladner, independent counsel may be warranted although
the question remains as to whether the insurer is obligated to pay
for that separate representation under the applicable liability insur
ance policy.24
22. 69th St. and 2nd Ave. Garage Assoes., L.P. v. TIeor TItle Guar. Co., 622
N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (emphasis added).
23. Ladner v. American Home Assurance Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (N.Y. App.
Div.1994).
24. Even where an independent counsel is in place, the insurer may nonetheless
maintain effective control of the litigation and settlement process. Although neither a
New York decision nor one in which selection of counsel was directly at issue, the re
cent California appellate decision in Western Polymer Technology v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
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Having discussed some of the situations where a conflict was
found to exist, the next phase of the defense process is the selection
and retention of competent legal counsel to represent the insured.
Here, an interesting issue arises as to whether the insurance com
pany may have any role in the selection of counsel.
In New York State Urban Development Corp. v. VSL Corp.,2S
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, inter
preting New York law, held that the insurer was indeed entitled to
participate in the selection process. The professional liability policy
at issue in VSL provided that the insurer would pay "all claims ex
penses" that were incurred in connection with a claim made against
the insured. Significantly, the policy defined "claims expenses" as
including fees charged by an attorney designated by the insurer or
by an attorney chosen by the insured with the written consent of the
insurer.26
In VSL, the parties agreed that a conflict did indeed exist. The
only issue before the court was whether the above provision permit
ted the insurer to participate in the selection of counsel. The court
agreed with the insurer, noting that the public policy considerations
underlying Prashker and Goldfarb did not override the contractual
provision in the policy. In this regard, the court stated:
It is not inherently objectionable to permit an insurer to partici
pate in the selection of independent counsel for the insured as
long as the insurer discharges its obligation in good faith and the
attorney chosen is truly independent and otherwise capable of
defending the insured.
The participation of the insurer in the selection process does not
automatically taint the independence of chosen counsel.27
The court further held that the insurer did not act in bad faith
by refusing to permit counsel designated by the insured to defend
the claim. The reason was that counsel had represented the insured
in the coverage action against the insurer and, accordingly, was hos
38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 (Cal. Ct. App.) review denied, 1995 Cal. LEXIS 2612 (Cal. April 13,
1995) is instructive. In that case, despite the fact that the insured was being defended
by a so-called Cumis counsel under section 2860, the insured was not able to preclude
the insurer from settling a claim in an amount and manner that allegedly injured the
insured's business reputation and impaired its ability to recover on certain cross-claims
against other parties.
25. 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
26. [d.
27. [d. at 65-66.
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tile towards the interests of the insurer. On this issue, the court
stated, "it was not unreasonable for [the insurer] to insist on coun
sel independent to both itself and [the insured]."28
Additionally, with specific regard to the facts of the VSL case,
the insurer's willingness to accommodate the insured appeared to
weigh heavily in the court's reasoning. The insurer had designated
an unquestionably competent and experienced firm, with whom it
had no previous dealings, as independent counsel. Alternatively,
the insurer afforded the insured the opportunity to submit a list of
proposed counsel to the insurer from which one would be chosen.
The insurer's manifested desire to "do the right thing" undoubtedly
cast a favorable light on its position.
Since VSL was decided, insurance companies have attempted
to invoke the rule allowing them to have meaningful input in the·
selection of counsel. To their dismay, however, the VSL holding
has been limited to its facts in subsequent decisions. For example,
in Emons Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO.,29 the pol
icy contained a "duty to defend" provision but lacked any require
ment that the insured obtain the insurer's consent before retaining
counsel. In the court's view, that fact alone distinguished Emons
from VSL, and the insurer was not permitted to participate in coun
sel's designation. 30
III.

ILLINOIS

Illinois law, like that of New York and California, generally
provides that if a conflict of interest is created by the insurer reserv
ing its rights, the insured is entitled to assume control of its own
defense, and the insurer must pay reasonable costs of defense in
curred by independent counsel retained by the insured. 31
"In determining whether a conflict of interest exists, Illinois
28. Id. at 66.
29. 749 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
30. Another distinguishing feature of Emons was that the insurer sought to re
place counsel who had been defending the underlying action, an exceedingly complex
matter, for several years. The court found that to allow the insurer to "pull the plug" on
its insured at that juncture would cause irreparable harm to the insured. Id. at 1295.
31. See, e.g., Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132,384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); Nandorf, Inc.
v. CNA Ins. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985); O'Bannon v. Northern
Petrochemical Co., 113 Ill. App. 3d 734, 447 N.E.2d 985 (1983); Clemmons v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 2d 469, 430 N.E.2d 1104 (1981);. See also Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976); Illinois Masonic Medical Ctr. v. Thregum
Ins. Co., 168 III. App. 3d 158, 522 N.E.2d 611 (1988) (specifically referring to "reason
able " costs) ..
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courts have considered whether, in comparing the allegations of the
complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be
furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those all ega
tions."32 The courts have identified two situations as creating con
flicts of interest so great as to require independent counsel: claims
alleging both covered and uncovered loss and claims where there
are conflicts between multiple parties insured by the same insurer.
Most frequently, conflicts will exist when allegations of both cov
ered and uncovered loss are made, creating the situation where
proof of certain facts would shift liability from the insurer to the
insured.
Several cases illustrate the analysis employed by the Illinois
courts in determining whether an insured is entitled to independent
counsel. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers ,33 the Supreme Court
of Illinois found a conflict where the insurer on a homeowner's pol
icy was required to defend an underlying personal injury action in
which allegations of negligent conduct (insured) and allegations of
intentional injury (uninsured) were made. The court reasoned that
if the insured is held responsible, it would be in his interest to be
found negligent, which, under the terms of the policy would place
the financial loss on the insurer. On the other hand, it would be to
the insurer's interest to have a determination that the insured com
mitted an intentional act, thus excluding the resulting loss from cov
erage. In these situations, as appears to be the case in California
and New York, it is not necessary for the insured and insurer to be
complete adversaries or for mutually exclusive theories of recovery
to be advanced. 34 For example, in Pepper Construction Co. v. Casu
alty Insurance Co., the court refused to dissolve a preliminary in
junction requiring the insurer to relinquish control of the defense
and reimburse the tnsured for defense costS.35 The underlying dis
pute in the case involved a contract between plaintiff, Pepper Con
struction Company, and Marshall Field & Co. to construct a store.
Plaintiff was the general contractor and had used various subcon
tractors. After construction was completed, sections of the store
32. See Pepper Const. Co. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d 516, 517, 495
N .E.2d 1183, 1184 (1986); Nandorf, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 137,479 N .E.2d at 992; County of
Massac v. United Stated Fidelity & Guar., 113 Ill. App. 3d 35, 43, 446 N.E.2d 584, 590
(1983).
33. 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Pepper, 145111. App. 3d at 519, 495 N.E.2d at 1185; Nandorf, 134 Ill.
App. 3d at 139, 479 N.E.2d at 993.
35. Pepper, 145 Ill. App: 3d at 520,495 N.E.2d at 1186.
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roof collapsed under heavy snowfall. At the time of the collapse,
the plaintiff was insured by defendant Casualty. Marshall Field
filed suit against the plaintiff and its subcontractors to recover con
sequential damages and repair costs paid to plaintiff.
Casualty acknowledged liability coverage for the consequential
damages but denied coverage for work performed by the plaintiff.
It argued ·that given its acknowledgment of liability for the conse
quential damages, a conflict was not created as its interests were not
clearly opposed to the insured's, and in fact its acknowledged liabil
ity gave it a greater interest in the insured's defense. The court
found this argument to be without merit. The insured's interest was
in a finding that it was vicariously liable for work performed by a
subcontractor, since in that event, Casualty was required to indem
nify it under the terms of its policy. In contrast, Casualty's interest
was in a finding that the insured's liability was based on work Pep
per performed, as this was not covered. The court found an "obvi
ous" conflict between the insurer and insured with regard to the
repair costs, stating:
The particulars of the conflict of interest do not matter, only the
fact that there is a conflict at all. The insured has the right to be
defended by counsel of his own choosing. A ruling that required
an insured to be defended by what amounted to his enemy in the
litigation would be foolish. 36

In Perkins Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co. ,37 the court
rejected the insured's argument that a conflict was created by the
fact that the insurer was interested in keeping litigation costs to a
minimum, while the insured wished to obtain a full and vigorous
defense. The court emphasized that Illinois has recognized only
two situations where the conflict of interest was so great as to re
quire independent counsel, and these facts did not fit within either
exception. 38 This is completely at odds with the VSL case discussed
above.
Likewise, punitive damages do not necessarily constitute a con
flict entitling the insured to independent counsel. In Nandorf, Inc.
v. CNA Insurance Co. ,39 the complaint in the underlying action
sought a large amount of punitive damages ($100,000) and a rela
36. Id. at 520, 495 N.E.2d at 1185 (quoting Murphy v. Urso, 88 III. 2d 444, 454, 430
N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1981».
37. 134 Ill. App. 3d 31, 479 N.E.2d 1078 (1985).
38. Id. at 34, 479 N.E.2d at 1081.
39. 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985).
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tively small amount of compensatory damages ($5,000). The in
surer disclaimed liability only for the punitive damages. While the
insured and insurer shared a common interest in a finding of no
liability, the court reasoned that their interests diverged if the in
sured was found liable. Under those circumstances, the insurer's
interest would have been just as well served by an award of minimal
compensatory damages and substantial punitive damages. As a re
sult, the insurer had an interest in providing a less than vigorous
defense to the allegations supporting an imposition of punitive
damages. Although the court found a conflict existed based on the
facts before it, it stated:
Our finding that a conflict of interest existed in the instant case is
not meant to imply that an insured is entitled to independent
counsel whenever punitive damages are sought in the underlying
action. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this litiga
tion, punitive damages formed a substantial portion of the poten
tial liability .... Notwithstanding the common interest of both
insurer and insured in finding total non-liability in the third party
action, the remaining interests of the two conflicted to such an
extent as to create an actual ethical conflict of interest warranting
payment of the insured's independent counsel by the insurer. 4o

The court in Illinois Municipal League Risk Management Asso
ciation v. Seibert, after discussing NandorJ, said "the proportional
ity between compensatory and punitive damages should not be a
guiding factor" in determining whether a conflict of interest exists.41
The underlying litigation in this case involved an action against Sei
bert, a police officer, for violations of section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act which allegedly occurred during an arrest. The plaintiff
sought $10,000,000 in compensatory and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages. The Association (a self-insurance program for municipal
ities) denied liability for punitive damages. The court found a con
flict existed, as the Association could benefit by a finding that
Seibert's conduct justified a punitive damage award since the Asso
ciation could be required to pay only minimal compensatory dam
ages, while Seibert could be personally liable for a large punitive
damage award. Further, as Seibert noted, punitive damages can be
awarded in civil rights litigation without proving actual damages. 42
40.
41.
(1992).
42.

[d. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993-94.
223 Ill. App. 3d 864, 875, 585 N.E.2d 1130, 1137, appeal denied, 596 N.E.2d 1

[d. at 876, 585 N.E.2d at 1138.
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However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
Co. 43 found that although plaintiffs in the underlying case claimed a
large amount of punitive damages ($25 million in each count) as
well as treble damages, no conflict was created. The court distin
guished Nandor! from the case before it, stating: "it is conceivable
the plaintiffs' request for compensatory damages 'as proven' might
result in a large award of compensatory damages."44
Illinois courts have also decided that, contrary to the New York
court's analysis in Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Guagenti 45 an in
surer's interest in negating policy coverage does not in and of itself
create a sufficient conflict to give rise to independent counsel.46
For example, in Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, the court
found "a conflict of interest cannot be inferred merely because an
insurance company is asserting noncoverage in a separate suit. The
test is whether or not there are conflicting interests based upon the
allegations found in the complaint."47 Here, the defendant in the
underlying action was found guilty of battery in a criminal proceed
ing. The victim of the battery filed a civil suit alleging a cause of
action for negligence. The insurer provided a defense but filed a
declaratory judgment action asserting that there was no coverage
under either its automobile or homeowner's policies.
The insured alleged this situation created a conflict of interest
which entitled him to independent counsel. The court disagreed,
finding that there was nothing in the allegations of the complaint
showing the interests of the insurer would be furthered by provid
ing a less than vigorous defense. The interests of the parties were
identical, i.e., to defeat the claim or minimize the damages
recovered.
In contrast, the court in Royal Insurance Co. v. Process Design
Associates, Inc. , looked beyond the allegations in the complaint and
found that a conflict was created based upon the actions of the in
surer.48 Royal, the general liability insurer, brought suit against its
insured and an excess insurer, seeking declaratory judgement that it
43. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.
1987).
44. Id. at 1047.
45. 599 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1993), see supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
46. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 160 Ill. App. 3d 146, 154, 513 N.E.2d 490,
496 (1987).
47. Id.
48. 221 Ill. App. 3d 966, 582 N.E.2d 1234 (1991).
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was not contractually obligated to a provide defense or indemnity
coverage to the insured. In the underlying actions, two employees
filed personal injury suits against the insured, Process Design; both
alleged violations of the Illinois Structural Work Act and common
law negligence.
Royal sent a letter to Process stating it was defending the com
plaints because of the allegations of negligence and further advised
that should the complaints be amended to include allegations of
professional negligence, there might be a question as to whether or
not Royal would continue to defend the actions, given that the pol
icy contained a professional liability exclusion. Royal contended
that no conflict existed because the underlying complaints never
made allegations of professional negligence. Thus, when comparing
the allegations in the complaint to the policy provisions, its interests
could not have been furthered by a less than vigorous defense.
However, the court found that Royal's actions during the time it
defended the case belied this argument, stating:
[D]efendants urge that Process was prejudiced by Royal's as
sumptions of its defense. Defendants maintain that, not only did
Royal not advise Process of its intention of reserving the profes
sional negligence exclusion, but Royal then undertook Process'
defense for over three years while attempting to find a way in
which Process might be found professionally negligent, thereby
relieving Royal of liability. For support, defendants point to the
several letters and memos written by Royal which indicate that,
throughout its defense of Process, it was working towards discov
ering a way to invoke its professional liability exclusion, thus im
munizing itself from liability to Process. 49

Consequently, the court found that Royal was estopped from
claiming it was not obligated to indemnify Process because of its
failure to advise Process of the conflict of interest and its failure to
properly reserve its rights. As previously mentioned, the second
situation in which Illinois courts have recognized conflicts of inter
est is when multiple parties are insured by the same insurer. For
example, in Murphy v. Urso,50 the Supreme Court of Illinois found
that a conflict requiring independent counsel arose when an injured
passenger in a vehicle sued both the owner (a preschool) and oper
ator of the vehicle (driver for preschool).51 The operator's negli
49. Id. at 976, 582 N.E.2d at 1241.
50. 88 II\, 2d 444, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (1981).
51. Id.
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gence appeared clear, leaving the owner's primary defense that the
vehicle was operated without its permission at the time of the
accident.
The insurer controlled the defenses of both defendants, and
their interests were diametrically opposed. The owner's best de
fense was to show that the operator did not have permission to use
the bus at the time of the accident, thus, shifting all liability to him,
while the operator's best defense was to establish permission, thus
shifting the risk of loss to the owner (and ultimately to the insurer,
which created an additional conflict). Given this conflict, the oper
ator was entitled to independent counsel. 52 In the employment
context, multi-party conflicts will most likely be present in sexual
harassment cases, where both the employer and alleged harasser
are named as defendants. The employer is likely to argue that the
alleged harasser acted outside the scope of his or her employment,
and thus, the employer should not have liability for the illicit
conduct.
Finally, Illinois courts have discussed several ways in which a
conflict can be resolved in lieu of appointing independent counsel.
The insurer can, of course, waive its coverage defenses and defend
without asserting a reservation of rights. Alternatively, the insured,
after full disclosure of the conflicts, can accept the defense of coun
sel appointed by the insurer. 53 According to the court in Royal,
"[i]f the insurer has adequately informed the insured of its election
to proceed under a reservation of rights, and the insured accepts the
insurer's tender of defense counsel the insurer has not breached its
duty of loyalty and is not estopped from asserting policy de
fenses. "54 A declaratory judgment action may also be available to
the insured in some instances depending on the nature of the con
52. Note that the driver in the case was not a named insured under the policy.
The" court noted that, "[i]t makes no difference that here the conflict was with a putative
insured instead of directly with the named insured." Id. at 444-45, 430 N.E.2d at 1084.
53. Similarly, in this regard, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(e) (1993) provides:
The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel by signing the
, following statement: "1 have been advised and informed of my right to select
independent counsel to represent me in this lawsuit. 1 have considered this
matter fully and freely waive my right to select independent counsel at this
time. I authorize my insurer to select a defense attorney to represent me in
this lawsuit."
Id.
54. Royal Ins. Co. v. Process Design Assocs., Inc., 221 III. App. 3d 966, 973-74,
582 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (1991) (citing Cowan v. Ins. Co., 22 III. App. 3d 883, 896, 318
N.E.2d 315, 326 (1974».
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flict at issue. 55 However, it will not be appropriate in those circum
stances where the coverage issue is closely or directly connected to
the issue of the insured's liability in the underlying action. 56
If the insurer assumes the defense under a reservation of rights
and fails to advise the insured of the conflict created, it is estopped
from denying coverage according to the Royal courtY Similarly, in
Peppers, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[i]f, however, by the
insurer's assumption of the defense the insured has been induced to
surrender his right to control his own defense, he has suffered a
prejudice which will support a finding that the insurer is estopped
to deny policy coverage."58
While Illinois courts seem uniform in permitting the insured to
select independent counsel, the Seventh Circuit in Tews Funeral
Home, found the insurer's providing a short list of reputable and
qualified counsel from which the insured could select its defense
counsel to be a reasonable compromise to the disputed issue of
counsel selection. 59
IV.

CONCLUSION

Turning away from the legal considerations, what practical dy
namics operate within the EPLI relationship between insurer and
insured to help assure both parties that their interests will be served
by selection of a competent, cooperative, and cost-effective defense
counsel?
While defense counsel retained by the insurer can never place
the interests of the insurer above that of the insured when those
interests conflict, it is generally recognized that such counsel also
55. But see Village Management, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Accident
Co., 662 F. Supp. 1366, 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1987), which seems to state that this alternative
should not be pursued when a conflict of interest prevents an insurer from undertaking
the insured's defense.
56. Thornton v. Paul, 74 III. 2d 132, 157, 384 N.E.2d 335, 345-46 (1978). In this
regard, the Illinois Supreme Court said:
Requiring the injured party to appear in the declaratory judgment action between the
insurer and the insured may deprive the injured party of his choice of forum and time
for bringing suit. Furthermore, he would appear as a defendant rather than as a plain
tiff, which may alter the burdens of proof and going forward with the evidence.
Id. (citing, Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment To Determine a Liability Insurer's
Duty to Defend-Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 101 (1965».
57. Royal, 221 III. App. 3d at 977-78, 582 N.E.2d at 1242.
58. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 III. 2d 187, 195, 355 N.E.2d 24, 29
(1976).
59. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th
Cir. 1987).
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owes certain duties to the insurer. As a practical matter, one can
not lose sight of the reality that such counsel are retained on a regu
lar basis by the insurer and their long-term economic interests
depend upon the relationship with the insurer, and not the insured.
Even so, it is not panel counsel's role to assist the insurer in
investigating coverage issues or to become an advocate for the in
surer's coverage position. In fact, panel counsel must be extremely
circumspect in how it handles the communication of any informa
tion to the insurer that may impact adversely on coverage of the
insured.
Nonetheless, this does not imply that defense counsel retained
by the insurer cannot effectively represent the insured's interest
even where the defense is being provided pursuant to a significant
reservation of rights. 60 Just as both the insurer and the counsel it
selects to defend the insured owe duties and obligations to the in
sureds being defended, the insurer is not without certain protec
tions of its own legitimate interests when the defense counsel is one
selected by the insured. In this regard, it may be helpful to consider
liability policies such as those in the directors' and officers' liability
("D & 0") area and other policies that do not afford the insurer the
right and duty to defend and to select counsel. Under those poli
cies, however, the insurer may nonetheless have an obligation to
payor reimburse the costs of defense.
To protect the insurer's interests under these policies, the in
surer will usually employ policy language to the effect that the in
sured's right to select counsel is subject to the insurer's consent,
which shall not be unreasonably withheld. In effect, the defense
counsel under these policies becomes a "Cumis-type" counsel, as
discussed above.
With respect to EPLI insurance, in the author's admittedly bi
ased view, EPLI insurers are for the most part firmly committed to
providing this insurance to the marketplace on both a widespread
and long-term basis. As such, their interests and those of their in
sureds in handling the defense should be very much in sync.
lt would thus be foolhardy for an EPLI insurer to assign as
defense counsel firms or lawyers having no meaningful employment
litigation experience but who otherwise do defense work for an in
surer at relatively attractive rates. In fact, EPLI insurers have put
60. Perhaps the best discussion of this issue may be found in Federal Ins. Co. v.
X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1990). See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
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together a fairly impressive "panel" of defense counsel qualified in
the employment area and generally at rates significantly higher
than those paid for most other insurance defense work. Addition
ally, there are a number of reasons why an EPLI insurer may be
willing to entertain the insured's wishes as to choice of counsel.
Employment-related litigation has unfortunately reached every
nook and cranny of this vast nation. It is rather impractical for an
insurer to have well-qualified counsel in place for each and every
jurisdiction and divisions thereof. Therefore, in certain cases, an
insurer may be quite willing (and in fact may have no choice but) to
listen to its insured as to selection of counsel if the insured has a
local counsel with the appropriate expertise.
Also, insurers are usually open to suggestions as to how they
may improve upon their panel of qualified counsel. In particular
situations, therefore, an insurer may be willing to "try out" a new
counsel recommended by an insured.
In summary, the EPLI insurer may well be able to prevail upon
its contractual language in retaining the right to select defense
counsel, but the legal, business, and practical considerations dis
cussed above present some very significant limitations on that right.

